The paper looks into the slow and at times controversial process of 'Europeanising' the Italian legal system, in order to exemplify how adaptation to changes takes place within entire branches of the state administration. Three examples are selected, all within the domain of labour law: state aid illegally granted to support training and work experience contracts; fixed term labour contracts in the public sector; free movement of foreign language assistants. Multi-level regulatory techniques are at the origin of adaptation, geared by institutional and quasiinstitutional actors. The main emphasis is on national judges engaging in a dialogue with the ECJ and delivering changes into the legal order as a whole.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The title of this paper embraces three concepts which will be used as paths to reach a destination. The destination is Italy, taken as an example of an active promoter of European integration, even when facing difficulties in complying with its obligations under the EC Treaty.
The first path leads towards judicial intervention, seen as a major tool for making changes within a national legal system. Some examples (section III) concern the scrutiny that the ECJ operates, when prompted by the Commission, acting under Article 88(2) EC. Other examples (sections IV and V) are related to the open dialogue national judges engage in with the ECJ, when they start preliminary references under Article 234 EC.
The second path almost intersects with the first one. It leads to an understanding of the notion of the adaptation of the legal system as a consequence of judicial intervention, and it pursues the idea that changes may need time to be transformed into an efficient performance of the state apparatus. The second path is therefore a slow one, and one that must be taken while paying attention to the overall evolution of legal traditions and the institutions behind them.
The third path is, because of my own prevailing expertise, a disciplinary one. It focuses on labour law and intends to use labour law as a paradigm of changes and adaptations brought about by European Community law in Italy.
II. A JOURNEY ACROSS SOME ITALIAN STEREOTYPES
Before moving along these three paths and in order to avoid getting lost in an Italian labyrinth, something must be said to support the choice of concentrating the analysis on Italy.
Although Italian is not a widely spoken language within the EU, the contributions of Italian scholars have accompanied and furthered European integration over the decades. In addition, comparative lawyers have benefited from studying the Italian system. For example, in the 1960s 4 Lord Wedderburn has filled his widespread comparative work with critical and constructive references to Italian legal developments. 5 He has devoted energy and enthusiasm to the training of young scholars in many parts of the world, including Italy, where for many years he took part in the 'Pontignano comparative seminars' at the University of Siena, in collaboration with labour lawyers from other European countries.
As can be seen, comparative law proved to be a helpful methodology in understanding the different, and at times troublesome, phases of European integration. Furthermore, as I shall indicate later, the comparative work of political scientists constitutes an invaluable interdisciplinary resource, often substantiated by field research. Such analysis is of help to lawyers in the understanding of changes occurring within national legal systems as a way of complying with European law.
All these examples-but many more could be quoted-engender pride as regards the role assigned to Italian legal scholarship and Italian developments. What needs to be ascertained and brought to the fore in this paper, almost in an exercise of self-analysis, is whether the same pride is engendered by the position Italy takes when facing developments in European law. In order to do so, one has to face yet another apparently insurmountable barrier: stereotypes about Italy's failure to comply with European law. Delays and difficulties in fulfilling the obligations arising from the Treaty can become the stereotype of a slow and disorganised country in which resistance to change is cultivated.
To combat these stereotypes, one has to start looking at both well-established tradition in European law had the authoritative role of a 'declaratory judgment', equal in its enforceability to the Treaty Articles interpreted, as well as to interpretative judgments given in preliminary references.
In 1994 the Constitutional Court clarified that the state can challenge the constitutionality of a regional law still in the process of being adopted on the basis that such a regional law breaches EC law. In 1996 it also indicated the state's obligation to enforce Community law via repressive or subsidiary measures with respect to the regions, despite the fact that the regions are granted legislative autonomy by the Constitution. The attention paid by political scientists to the slow and, at times, subtle transformation taking place inside the state administration alerts lawyers to the fact that the impact of European law on national legal systems must be understood as a multi-faceted process. It is closely intertwined with practices of mutual learning and with exchanges of expertise between groups, as well as between public institutions. In this context labour law offers a significant insight. In addition, the Italian tradition of building consensus between policy-makers and representatives of management and labour favours the openness of the legal and economic systems, making it more receptive to change. 25 Furthermore, constitutional reforms aim at a balanced collaboration between the centre and the periphery. Their rationale is to establish an institutional equilibrium in exercising state powers, while furthering new ways of boosting an efficient participation in the EU.
However, the pride of an Italian lawyer must now give way to a recognition of some of the difficulties faced by Italy in absorbing European law. Recent ECJ rulings in key areas of labour law disclose a tension in maintaining intact certain characteristics of the national legal system, while pursuing market integration. Such a tension underlines the urgency of 'Europeanising' Italy even further.
In furthering Member States' compliance with market integration, judges deliver changes when they directly apply European law, or refer cases to the ECJ in preliminary ruling procedures. They may otherwise be compelled to do so by the ECJ, when the ECJ imposes on them the duty to interpret national law in conformity with European law.
To conclude, in trying to understand Italy's attitude to the requirements of European law the image is one of slowness. However, it is argued in this paper, slowness can, in certain circumstances, be viewed as a resource. We turn now to consider labour law and the Italian response to the issues that arose in three areas: state aid legislation, enforcement of the European principle of equality in the public sector, and freedom of movement for foreign language assistants. The slow and imprecise responses of the Italian legislature in all these three areas are nevertheless capable of prompting a process of adaptation within the state administration. The assumption is that, notwithstanding the urgency to comply with European law, significant changes intervene only when a national legal system is mature enough to respond with its own answers.
The cases considered in the above mentioned three sectors revolve around contracts of employment of a fixed duration. In most current reforms of national labour markets, fixed-term contracts are a good example of the persisting tension legislators have to face when they aim at introducing more flexible labour law measures. In all three areas of European Community law taken into account, the recourse to fixed-term contracts is controversial, albeit for different reasons. One conclusion to anticipate is that contracts with a fixed duration do not provide a predictable solution to labour market demands; neither do they represent an easy managerial resource. The ECJ rulings analysed in the next sections indicate that, regardless of the national peculiarities invoked, fixed-term contracts must comply with fundamental rights and fundamental market freedoms.
III. STATE AID GRANTED FOR TRAINING AND WORK EXPERIENCE CONTRACTS
Italy has been condemned by the ECJ for granting state aid for promoting employment incompatible with the common market and for not adopting all measures necessary for the recovery from the recipients of aid granted within the time limit prescribed. 27 To understand this case, we need to consider some background. In a later ruling the Court confirmed that sanctions aimed at getting back what had unlawfully been granted were the only possible response to combating unlawful practices. The
Court rejected arguments such as protection of the legitimate expectations of recipients, 38 and did not accept the plea made by Italy that time after the notification would be too short to recover the aid. With regard to the latter point, it was necessary further to specify that Article 88(2) does not provide for a pre-litigation phase, and therefore the Commission is not required to issue a reasoned opinion in order to allow Member States the time to comply with its decision.
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The story of Italian training and work experience contracts has an interesting postscript. ECR I-70, para 42, the ECJ once more ruled that a Member State cannot plead as a defence the unlawfulness of a decision addressed to it, in an action for a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its obligations arising out of its failure to implement that decision. 39 Case C-99/02, above n 38, para 24. 40 In sum, it could therefore be said that a tiresome story of non-compliance with European
Community law on state aid has paved the way for a potentially dynamic example of deliberative democracy in which private and public actors have taken responsibility for finding solutions.
One could argue in this regard that stereotypes may even be vehicles for change.
IV. FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
I move now to the second stage of this Italian journey, presenting two very similar cases decided by the ECJ, following a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Genova. broader set of reasons for concluding such contracts. 52 It also limits the role previously assigned to collective agreements in indicating the organisational reasons leading to the stipulation of these contracts. 53 There has been disagreement among commentators as to whether the so-called non-regression clause (clause 8.3 of the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work) has been infringed, because of the allegedly inferior conditions granted to workers. So far, however, recourse to that clause does not seem to have offered a sufficiently strong ground for claims in the courts.
A short digression: this case study shows that trusting judges, as suggested in the title of this paper, is not without limits. In a recent case, the Constitutional Court 54 had to decide whether there was unlawful differential treatment for workers in the agricultural sector as a consequence of a lack of collective agreements which previously guaranteed, under certain conditions, the conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent ones. This implied a violation of the non-regression clause. However, the Italian Corte Costituzionale 55 sent the case back to the referring (national) court, quoting as ius superveniens the ECJ ruling in
Mangold. 56 The highly contentious decision in Mangold, initiated by a reference from a German court, deals, in fact, with a completely different typology of fixed-term contractsnamely measures to keep in employment workers over a certain age who would otherwise have been at risk of being expelled from the labour market. However, the Italian Constitutional
Court quoted Mangold out of context, choosing the passage in which the ECJ states that less favourable measures applying to fixed-term contracts are not, as such, prohibited by the Directive when they are not strictly linked to its enforcement. The quotation is so abrupt that it seems almost dismissive of the real issue at stake. The Constitutional Court does not want to engage in the very delicate exercise of comparing labour standards, which could represent an encroachment upon legislative discretion. After all, this was one of the reasons why the ECJ took its own different route in Mangold, referring instead to the equality principle as a general 52 Art 1(1) of the above-mentioned Decree states: 'an employment contract may be concluded for a fixed term for technical reasons or for reasons related to imperative requirements of production, organisation or replacement of workers'. principle of European law.
The non-regression clause in the Fixed-Term Work Directive, an ambiguous and slightly mysterious invention of the European legislature, is controversial in the field of social policies.
Reference to it is tactically avoided in Mangold and completely ignored in Vassallo and in
Marrosu.
57 The issue at stake in the latter two cases is the extensive interpretation given to the notion of objective reasons in clause 5 of the Framework Agreement. This allows an employer to enter into several fixed-term contracts and to go beyond the duration indicated. Abuses in the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts, according to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, are to be prevented. However, Member States retain the discretion to exclude specific sectors from the obligation of having fixed-term contracts extended into permanent contracts. However, as Advocate General Poiares Maduro points out in his Opinion, such freedom must be exercised within the limits set by principles of European law and, in particular, the principle of equal treatment.
58
This principle must prevail even when taking into account, as the Advocate General does when paying apparent homage to the Italian Constitutional Court, 59 that employment in the public sector occurs by way of a concorso-a public competition whereby the selection of candidates is made according to certain procedures-rather than by entering into a private law contract. The constitutional principles underlying recruitment by public competition are the principle of equality and the principle of sound administration, enshrined respectively in Articles 3 and 97 of the Italian Constitution. The legitimate goal pursued in binding the public administration to these standards must be measured against the principle of proportionality, whereby different treatment must be justified in order to meet general principles of European law. However, the homage to the Constitutional Court is, as suggested, only an elegant rhetorical device, since its ruling, given in 2003, went in precisely the opposite direction, holding as constitutional the differential treatment reserved to fixed-term public employees.
The ECJ followed the Advocate General's opinion and ruled in favour of applying the Directive to fixed-term contracts in the public sector, specifying that measures to prevent abuse must be 'proportionate, but also sufficiently effective and a sufficient deterrent to ensure that the 57 Cited above n 49. (4)). The Court used a comparative test, trying to establish whether there was discrimination based on the grounds of nationality, and discovered that this was indeed the case.
The unequal treatment had to do with not granting permanent employment to predominantly foreign language assistants, whereas similar tenured jobs were reserved to Italian citizens.
In the background to this controversy lies a rather interesting disagreement between the ECJ and the highest Italian judicial bodies as a result of a remarkable proliferation of cases in the Italian courts over the years. Litigation has often been supported by university trade unions, exceptionally active in defending this rather unique category of foreign employees. 71 The law referred to at the origin of this controversy is a 1962 Act on fixed-term contracts of employment, subsequently amended by various other measures. 72 The Court used that Act as a basis for comparing the treatment reserved to foreign language assistants with that applied to other similar categories of employees. The result was the discovery that conversion into a permanent contract was not granted to foreign employees, nor was the recognition of acquired rights.
Even after the adoption of a new law reforming the status of foreign language assistants to make them 'linguistic associates', unequal treatment continued to prevail, thus opening up a 70 It is therefore crucial, as this last detour of this journey into the Italian university system
shows, that all branches of the administration affected by judicial decisions be revitalised and forced into more virtuous conduct, when it comes to their having to comply with European law.
The enlightened bureaucratic élite evoked earlier in this paper, similar to that leading Italy into full participation in the EU, should equally disseminate its expertise at lower levels of the state administration. From the cases examined, it appears, in fact, that the system of state universities may still be lacking the necessary input to introduce significant reforms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
There may be a sense of emptiness and regret in reading between the lines of ECJ judgments, whenever they reveal inefficient compliance mechanisms in a Member State. A full trust in judges delivering changes must be accompanied in all such cases by an equal trust in the capacity of legal systems to regenerate themselves while undergoing significant reforms. The cure ought to be found in an integrated or, as we learn from the language of other disciplines, multi-level approach to the 'Europeanisation' of national legal systems. Multi-level regulatory techniques assist institutional and quasi-institutional actors in narrowing the gap between the European legal system and the rights of individual citizens. They respond to what has been described in this paper as the adaptation of entire branches of the state administration in response to the challenges of European law. Changes pursued from inside the state administration are the result of slow and yet fully developed reforms, resulting from the evolution of institutions, rather than from the contingent pressure of the market. The false contraposition between 'old' and 'new' national legal orders can thus be framed in a more consistent pattern of institutional changes.
Italy has inside its own state organisation more than one gear in which to operate in order 
